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1. Introduction 
It is common knowledge that computer skills are remunerated well in the job market. 
Internships are only available for students with an excellent knowledge of word-processing 
and spreadsheet analysis, employers require at least one programming language, lectures are 
inconceivable without a video projector running a sophisticated presentation, statistics are 
impossible without powerful specialized programs, and informatics students can earn twice 
the salary of a well-paid economist. The objective of this study is to analyze why knowledge 
of computer applications pays so well. Of course, computer wage differentials may be 
justified, because computers enable workers to become more productive, which in turn makes 
them more valuable to their companies. On the other hand, there is much criticism of 
computer-related productivity improvements, and reasonable doubt that the PC wage 
premium is due solely to the increased productivity of computer systems. The question is, to 
what extent can existing PC wage differentials be attributed to computer-increased 
productivity, and to what extent can they be explained by individual differences in human 
capital investment or by unobservable individual characteristics such as ability?  
 
Existing studies of computer wage premiums are divided about whether workers receive a 
computer wage premium because they are more able or because the new technology increases 
their productivity. According to the productivity-enhancing hypothesis, workers should be 
remunerated more highly as soon as they start using a computer at work, while the competing 
hypothesis states that PC users would already have been better-paid before the introduction of 
the new technology. Most existing studies of the role of computer technology in changes in 
the wage structure show that workers who use a computer at work earn 10 – 20% more than 
those who do not (see e.g., Krueger 1993, Bell 1996, Miller and Mulvey 1997, and DiNardo 
and Pischke 1997). One of the first studies to investigate the impact of computer use on wage 
differentials, by Krueger (1993), finds a computer wage premium of up to 15% using cross-
section data. By contrast, Oosterbeek (1997) shows that, for the Netherlands, the computer 
wage premium does not vary with the intensity of computer use. He suggests that returns from 
computer use can be attributed to factors other than the higher productivity of PC-using 
workers. This might be the case because workers of high ability do the more demanding 
computer jobs. Gollac and Kramarz (1997) attribute this phenomenon to the frequent 
occurrence of changes in (computer) technology as well as in organization, where the capacity 
to adapt to those changes is rewarded. Furthermore, firms anticipate progress in 
computerization in the near future, and therefore search for a workforce that is already 
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adapted to the new technology. DiNardo and Pischke (1997) also doubt any causal 
relationship between the use of computers at work and wage premiums. Using detailed 
information on German workers’ jobs and on the tools used in those jobs, they find evidence 
of wage differentials ranging from 9% to 14% associated with other “white-collar” tools such 
as calculators, telephones, and pencils, as well as evidence of a wage penalty linked to “blue-
collar” tools. These findings suggest that the tools approximate the occupational wage 
structure, and that workers who use computers on the job possess unobserved skills, which 
lead to higher wages.  
 
Whereas cross-section studies are inadequate for capturing the individual components of 
wage determination, various panel studies have investigated the effect of unobserved 
heterogeneity on the computer wage premium. Bell (1996) analyzes the impact of computer 
use on earnings, using data for the United Kingdom. He finds empirical support for the 
productivity-enhancing explanation in the form of a wage premium for computer use of 17% 
after the inclusion of worker and employer characteristics, such as firm size, industry and 
occupation dummies, and one of 14% after adding ability test scores. His findings of a 
positive relation between wages and PC use at work, using cross-section data for 1991, are 
confirmed by the panel study and by a cross-section study for 1981, in which he uses future 
skills (observed in 1991) as covariates. Bell (1996) therefore refutes the suggestion that the 
computer wage premium simply captures unobserved heterogeneity. This interpretation is 
also supported by Miller and Mulvey (1997) who conduct a cross-section study for Australia.  
 
However, the studies that use matched employee-employer data, by Doms, Dunne, and 
Troske (1997) for the U.S., and by Entorf and Kramarz (1994, 1997) for France, demonstrate 
that new technology workers received a wage premium before the introduction of this 
technology. These studies find that controlling for firm heterogeneity attenuates the wage 
premium received by workers for using computer-related new technology. In the longitudinal 
studies by Entorf and Kramarz (1994, 1997), the significance of the computer variables 
almost completely disappears, whereas the coefficients of computer experience remain 
significant. They show that the wage premium is due to computer-based new technologies 
being used by more able workers, which suggests that “firms select their best employees 
when they need someone to work using computer-based new technology with high 
autonomy” (Entorf and Kramarz 1994, P. 24). The preceding results are confirmed by Entorf, 
Gollac, and Kramarz (1999), who find that the introduction of individual fixed effects into the 
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longitudinal model leads to a substantially lower computer wage premium than that obtained 
in the cross-section study. Therefore, they demonstrate that PC users were already better paid 
before the new technology was introduced in their jobs, and suggest that “unobserved but 
compensated characteristics of the workers matter” (Entorf, Gollac, and Kramarz 1999, P. 
464). Haisken-DeNew and Schmidt (1999) doubt that there are computer-use wage 
differentials worth speaking of in Germany. They find that the significance of coefficients for 
PC use almost completely disappears in the longitudinal study, and conclude that “for 
Germany, unobserved individual heterogeneity or ability plays the key role in effectively 
explaining away the apparent wage premium for using a computer at work” (Haisken-DeNew 
and Schmidt 1999, P. 10). In this study we extend the model of Haisken-DeNew and Schmidt 
(1999) by using future information of computer use as a further control for ability. Our 
findings reject the productivity hypothesis: the higher pay of PC users cannot be traced back 
to computer-related productivity increases.  
 
2. Data  
The data used in this study were made available by the German Socio-Economic Panel Study 
(GSOEP) at the German Institute for Economic Research (DIW) in Berlin. The GSOEP is a 
representative longitudinal micro-database that provides a wide range of socio-economic 
information on private households in Germany. Data were first collected from about 12,200 
randomly selected adult respondents (in 6,000 families) in the former West Germany in 1984. 
After German reunification in 1989, the GSOEP was extended by about 4,500 persons (in 
2,200 families) from the former East Germany. In the most recent wave, for 1999, about 
13,000 respondents were still participating in the panel study. The GSOEP data is available as 
a public-use file containing 95% of the GSOEP sample, with some variables omitted for 
reasons of data protection (see Wagner et al. 1993, or for more detailed information, Haisken-
DeNew and Frick 2000).  
 
We use GSOEP data from 1985 to 1999 for male and female West German full-time 
employees aged between 20 and 65, excluding foreigners and civil servants. The first wave 
was excluded, since some questions that are important for this study were not included in 
1984. We used an unbalanced panel, and included only those respondents who participated in 
at least two waves of the survey so that we could control for individual unobserved 
heterogeneity. In addition, we had to exclude all respondents who had not participated in the 
survey in 1997, because this is the year in which the information required to construct a 
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variable that indicates PC use was obtained from respondents. In total, the sub-sample 
consists of 22,361 respondents, while 1,527 observations for 1999 are available for the cross-
section study. 
 
The GSOEP provides detailed information on earnings. Our dependent variable is monthly 
gross earnings including extra payments, such as the Christmas bonus, holiday pay, income 
from profit sharing, and other bonuses. Extra payments have become increasingly important 
in recent years, and Pierce (1999) found that excluding extra payments from earnings tends to 
understate wage differentials. Since monthly labor income overstates the remuneration of 
workers whose weekly hours of work exceed 40, it would be appropriate to use the hourly 
wage rate by dividing earnings by working hours. However, hourly wages as used by 
Haisken-DeNew and Schmidt (1999) might understate the earnings of managers and other 
workers who work long hours. Therefore, this study uses total monthly compensation as used 
by Entorf and Kramarz (1994), and uses working time as a control variable to prevent 
differences in working hours from distorting the estimates. 
 
All earnings regressions are run separately for men and women and include control variables 
such as education, experience, age, marital status, five firm size bands, and dummies for six 
occupations, nine regions, 14 time periods, and 14 industries. The GSOEP also provides 
information on PC use, which is the central variable in this study, on which a question was 
only included in the 1997 survey. For that year, the survey indicates whether a respondent 
used a PC, and identifies the year in which he or she first used a PC at work. The same 
information was collected on the use of a PC at home.1 It is relatively easy to trace back PC 
use retrospectively for the years before 1997 from the information on when a respondent first 
used a computer (see Haisken-DeNew and Schmidt 1999, P. 4). The underlying assumption is 
that once a person uses a computer, he uses one in all subsequent years. In 1998, only 
information on the frequency of private PC use was collected, whereas in 1999 respondents 
were asked only about professional PC use. To obtain dummy variables for PC use at work 
and PC use at home for each wave, we overcame the problem of missing information as 
follows. If a person used a PC at work in 1997, the dummy variable is set equal to unity in the 
                                                        
1
 The information on computer use was obtained from the 1997 GSOEP personal questionnaire from the 
following question: “Do you use a computer at home/at work, and if so, since what year at home/at work?”  
The original German text reads as follows: “Benutzen Sie privat oder beruflich (bzw. in Ihrer Ausbildung) einen 
Computer? Gemeint sind hier Personal-Computer (PC) aber auch Grossrechneranlagen, jedoch nicht reine 
Spielcomputer! [Ja/Nein], ich benutze [einen/keinen] Computer [privat/beruflich] und zwar seit ...”. 
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two subsequent years. 2 The same is done for PChome.3 If the respondent did not use a PC at 
work in 1997, the PC dummy is set equal to zero in 1998, and is set equal to unity in 1999 
provided the respondent was using a PC at work according to the 1999 survey. If the 
respondent did not use a PC at home in 1997, but there is evidence of private PC use in 1998, 
then the PC dummy is set equal to unity in the two subsequent years. If there is no evidence of 
private PC use in 1997 and 1998, then the PChome dummy is set to zero in 1998 and 1999. 
The PChome variable provides a complete picture of a person’s computer utilization, and its 
inclusion reduces bias in the coefficient of PC use at work “due to omitted factors which are 
associated with computer-use more generally”(Krueger 1993, P. 43).  
 
3. Estimation Methods 
The first model (I) in this study adopts a simple approach to replicate the cross-sectional 
findings of most studies on PC wage differentials. For 1999, the standard cross-sectional 
earnings equation is augmented by a dummy variable indicating whether a worker uses a 
computer at work. In addition, as well as the use of other control variables, a variable for PC 
use at home is used to capture some of the unobserved individual characteristics. Let wi be 
individual i’s monthly wage.4 The Mincer-type specification of the earnings regression is: 
(1) iiii ucCPbXw +′+′=ln       model (I) 
where Xi are standard control variables and PCi is a vector of dummy variables, which are 
equal to unity if the individual uses a computer at work, at home, or both, b and c are vectors 
of parameters to be estimated, and ui denotes the unobservable effects. At this point, 
unobserved individual characteristics will be only partially captured, at best, by adding the 
PChome variable to the regression for computer wage differentials. Model (II) is very similar 
to model (I) except that, as in the study by Haisken-DeNew and Schmidt (1999),  panel data is 
used to run a pooled regression as well as random effects and fixed effects estimations in 
order to control for unobservable individual characteristics:  
(2) itititit ucCPbXw +′+′=ln      model (II) 
                                                        
2
 In what follows, the dummy variables for using a PC at work, at home, and at work and at home are referred to 
as PCwork, PChome and PCboth. 
3
 We admit that in this way we wasted some of the information of 1998 and 1999 in order to have a consistent 
way of dealing with the PC use information, since we wanted to keep the assumption that PC use in one year 
means also PC use in all subsequent years. However, only a low percentage of workers who used a PC in 1997 
did not use one in 1998 and 1999, which supports our assumption.  
4
 In what follows, the wage refers to the total monthly compensation of a worker.  
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An alternative approach to test the productivity-enhancing hypothesis is to include 
information on future PC use at work in a longitudinal analysis, which might capture 
unobserved worker characteristics. This approach is similar to that of Bell (1996) who, in a 
cross-section study, regressed the log of hourly wages, not only on standard control variables 
but also on variables for skills that were measured in a subsequent survey conducted ten years 
later. The use of the future PC variable is possible given the relatively long panel data period, 
which can be split into two sub-periods: one from 1985 to 1987, the other post-1987. The first 
period is used as a sub-sample on which the longitudinal wage regressions are run. The 
second period is only used to provide information on whether a PC has been used at work 
after 1987.5 In what follows, this information is referred to as future PC use, as observed from 
the perspective of the first period. The model can be represented as follows: 
(3) 8785,9988,8785,8785,8785,ln −−−−− +′+′+′= iiiii ueCPcCPbXw  model (III) 
where dummy variables for computer-use at work after 1987, PCi,88-99, are included. The 
variables for PC use indicate whether a survey respondent uses a computer at work today 
(1985-1987) and/or in the future (after 1987). With regard to future PC use, we distinguish in 
the first version of model (III) between: no PC use at work in either the first or second period; 
no PC use at work in the first period, but some in the second period; and PC use at work in 
both the first and second periods. In addition to these dummy variables, more detailed 
information on future PC use is added to another version of model (III); that is, information 
on when the future PC use at work transpires. A distinction is made between different future 
PC variables, since PC use in the near future might have a different effect on wages than PC 
use in the distant future. In the early years of the second period, working with computers at 
work was evidently rather exceptional given that until 1989 less than 20% of workers were 
PC users. However, from 1995 onwards, the proportion of PC users was above 50%, and rose 
even more until 1999, when more than two-thirds of those surveyed used a computer at work, 
and PC use at work was rather common. Therefore, in the second version of model (III) 
instead of one future PC variable we use four dummy variables to distinguish between future 
PC use occurring before 19886, between 1988 and 1990, between 1991 and 1994, and after 
1994. Consequently, the following variables relating to PC use at work are incorporated into 
the panel study: no PC use today or in the future; no PC use today but some in the immediate 
                                                        
5
 This dividing line was drawn in order to obtain future information relating to the longest possible time period 
(1988-1999) whilst still being able to control for unobserved worker heterogeneity with panel data (1985-1987). 
6
 PC use before 1988 would be future PC use for workers who did not use a PC at work in 1985 (1986) but did 
so in 1986 (1987). 
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future (before 1988); no PC use today but some in the near future (between 1988 and 1990); 
no PC use today but some in the medium future (between 1991 and 1994); no PC use today 
but some in the distant future (after 1994); and PC use today and in the future.  
 
Since the future PC-use variables cannot have a causal effect on current wage determination, 
one might suppose that the coefficients of the future PC variables will not be significant in the 
regression analysis. However, wages might be statistically affected by these variables. If PC 
use at work in the future has a statistical influence on wages today, this suggests that the 
future PC-use variables capture unobserved worker characteristics such as ability, which does 
affect earnings. If so, the same might be true of current PC variables. If variables on future PC 
use are closely related to worker ability, then so too probably are variables on current PC use, 
which thus capture worker ability rather than productivity effects. This would imply that 
computer wage differentials merely indicate a wage premium due to unobserved worker 
characteristics rather than to productivity improvements attributable to computers.  
 
4. Results 
Compared to the cross-sectional study, in which the wage premium from using a PC at work 
is around 6,5% for men when control variables are included, the computer wage premium 
estimated by the pooled regression is much smaller, as can be seen in Table 1. When looking 
at the random effects estimator, it is striking that all coefficients for, and explanatory power 
of, the PC-use variables are considerably reduced. In the regressions for men, the dummy 
variable for PC use at work shrinks to around 1% and loses some of its significance in all 
three versions of model (II). When the wage equation for female workers is estimated with 
random effects, all coefficients for the PC use at work variables remain statistically 
significant, but are substantially reduced to around 2%. The fixed effects estimator applied to 
model (II) reveals even more sobering results concerning the wage premium from using a 
computer at work. The PCwork variable is not statistically significant in the regressions for 
either men or women. Furthermore, the fixed effects model has significantly negative wage 
premiums for the PChome variable for men, and a significantly positive coefficient for 
PCboth.7  
                                                        
7
 Using the Hausman test to test the fixed effects model against the random effects model indicates evidence of a 
correlation between the individual effects and the regressors, which supports the fixed effects assumption. 
However, the random effects model is superior to the pooled OLS estimator, which is revealed by the Breusch 
and Pagan Lagrange multiplier test for random effects.   
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Table 1: Model (I) and (II): Regressions with Standard Control Variables 
 Cross-Section 1999 Longitudinal Regressions 1985 – 1999 
  Pooled OLS Random Effects Fixed Effects 
Variable Men Women Men Women Men Women Men Women 
         
PCwork 0.0641** 
(0.0194) 
0.0533** 
(0.0311) 
0.0253** 
(0.0048) 
0.0629** 
(0.0065) 
0.0118* 
(0.0048) 
0.0268** 
(0.0067) 
-0.0008 
(0.0050) 
0.0130 
(0.0072) 
χ2-LM-Test     Men:  17195.2; Women:  5995.6  
Hausman-Test    Men:  2973.3    Women:  3330.1 
         
         
PCwork 0.0564** 
(0.0197) 
0.0488 
(0.0313) 
0.0141** 
(0.0050) 
0.0576** 
(0.0065) 
0.0112* 
(0.0050) 
0.0237** 
(0.0067) 
0.0007 
(0.0052) 
0.0110 
(0.0072) 
PChome 0.0335 
(0.0157) 
0.0289 
(0.0237) 
0.0403** 
(0.0050) 
0.0439** 
(0.0081) 
0.0026 
(0.0049) 
0.0304** 
(0.0079) 
-0.0137** 
(0.0051) 
0.0209* 
(0.0083) 
χ2-LM-Test     Men: 16816.3; Women:  5936.4  
Hausman-Test    Men:  1839.5;    Women: 8803.8 
         
         
PCwork 0.0566* 
(0.0233) 
0.0726* 
(0.0336) 
0.0122* 
(0.0056) 
0.0564** 
(0.0068) 
0.0046 
(0.0055) 
0.0204** 
(0.0069) 
-0.0078 
(0.0057) 
0.0070 
(0.0074) 
PChome 0.0338 
(0.0256) 
0.1254* 
(0.0558) 
0.0340** 
(0.0079) 
0.0345* 
(0.0166) 
-0.0121 
(0.0072) 
0.0059 
(0.0148) 
-0.0234** 
(0.0074) 
-0.0106 
(0.0156) 
PCboth -0.0005 
(0.0318) 
-0.1156 
(0.0606) 
0.0102 
(0.0098) 
0.0119 
(0.0186) 
0.0242** 
(0.0086) 
0.0309* 
(0.0159) 
0.0274** 
(0.0088) 
0.0393* 
(0.0165) 
χ2-LM-Test     Men:  16814.3;  Women: 5338.1  
Hausman-Test    Men: 1233.2;  Women: 9632.6 
 
  
  
 
  
  
Observations 1070 457 Men:  15536; Women: 6825 
Source: GSOEP, 1985-1999. 
Notes: * Statistically significant at the 5% level, ** at the 1% level. Standard errors in parentheses. 
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It is well to pause at this point and reflect on the preliminary findings. Controlling for 
unobserved heterogeneity the wage premiums for computer usage were substantially reduced 
in the random effects model. In the fixed effects model, all the variables indicating PC use at 
work were statistically insignificant. These results indicate that it is not computer-induced 
productivity, but unobserved yet compensated worker characteristics, that matter.  
 
This can be tested further by model (III), where variables for future PC use at work are 
included in the longitudinal regressions for the years from 1985 to 1987. Information from 
surveys after 1987 enables analysis of how computer wage premiums may be affected by 
those future variables which, though unable to have a causal effect on wage determination, 
may be statistically significant, perhaps because they capture unobserved worker 
heterogeneity. The drawback of this approach is that we cannot use the fixed effects estimator 
because the future PC variables do not vary over time. However, since we put future PC 
variables as indicator for ability directly in our model, we can test our hypothesis that 
unobserved heterogeneity is captured by future PC use. The advantage is therefore that we can 
measure actual ability.  
 
The regression analysis reveals that not all wage differentials implied by the future PC-use 
dummies are statistically significant when standard control variables are included (see Table 
2). The initial estimates of the first version of model (III) show that both men and women 
receive a wage premium if they do not use a PC today, but will do so in the future (PC01). 
The future wage premium for men is around 3% in the pooled OLS regression and 5% in the 
random effects model, whereas women receive a future PC-use premium of around 4% 
according to both regressions. An even higher premium is obtained from using a PC today 
and in the future (PC11). As can be expected, the coefficients and explanatory power of this 
dummy variable remain virtually unchanged in both the pooled OLS and random effects 
specifications when more detailed information on future PC use is added to model (III) by 
including variables that indicate when a computer would be used for the first time in the 
future (second version). The division of the future PC-use variable PC01 into four different 
dummies, PC0, PC1, PC2, and PC3, which indicate how far into the future is the first use of a 
PC at work, reveals that the point in time does indeed matter. 
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Table 2: Model (III): Longitudinal Regressions with PC Future Variables and Standard Controls  
 Estimates for men Estimates for women 
Variable Pooled OLS Random 
Effects 
Pooled OLS Random 
Effects 
First Version     
PC01:  Did not use a computer today (1985-
1987), but in the future (after 1987) 
0.0307** 
(0.0116) 
0.0461** 
(0.0169) 
0.0414* 
(0.0165) 
0.0424 
(0.0227) 
PC11:  Used a computer today and in future 0.0499** 
(0.0157) 
0.0762** 
(0.0215) 
0.0816** 
(0.0220) 
0.1025** 
(0.0277) 
χ2-LM-Test  691.0 323.5 
   
Second Version     
PC0:  Did not use a computer today, but in 
the immediate future (before 1988) 
-0.0194 
(0.0372) 
0.0282 
(0.0348) 
0.0324 
(0.0495) 
0.0357 
(0.0412) 
PC1:  Did not use a computer today, but in 
the near future (between 1988 and 1990) 
0.0423* 
(0.0174) 
0.0541* 
(0.0254) 
0.1020** 
(0.0257) 
0.1060** 
(0.0372) 
PC2:  Did not use a computer today, but in 
the medium future (between 1991 and 1994) 
0.0319* 
(0.0161) 
0.0550* 
(0.0241) 
0.0452* 
(0.0231) 
0.0380 
(0.0340) 
PC3:  Did not use a computer today, but in 
the distant future (after 1994) 
0.0273 
(0.0180) 
0.0350 
(0.0279) 
-0.0311 
(0.0272) 
-0.0125 
(0.0379) 
PC11:  Used a computer today and in future 0.0506** 
(0.0158) 
0.0728** 
(0.0227) 
0.0821** 
(0.0219) 
0.0996** 
(0.0308) 
χ2-LM-Test 689.7 317.0 
   
Observations 2,617 1,048 
Source: GSOEP, 1985-1999. 
Notes: * Statistically significant at the 5% level, ** at the 1% level. Standard errors in parentheses. 
 
 
Of the individuals who had not used a PC at work when they were originally surveyed, those 
who would be using a computer in the near future (PC1) had the highest wage premium on 
average. The wage equations for male workers reveal coefficients of up to 6% for future PC 
use PC1 and PC2, while PC use in the immediate future (PC0) or distant future (PC3) has no 
explanatory power. Women who would be using a PC in the near future receive a premium of 
11% relative to those who would not be using a PC at all. In comparison with the wage 
premiums from the pooled OLS regression, those from the random effects model were 
slightly higher.  
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The estimates show that future computer use seems to have an important statistical effect on 
wage determination, and one that is more than half as strong as that of current computer use. 
This is evidence against the productivity-enhancing explanation of PC wage differentials, 
since the statistical influence of future PC use at work on wages today is an indication that 
future PC-use variables capture worker heterogeneity. Therefore, wages are determined not by 
future PC use at work (which is impossible anyway), but by unobserved worker 
characteristics, with future PC use perhaps serving as a proxy for ability.8 Due to the close 
association between future PC-use variables and individual characteristics, which are well-
remunerated in the labor market, it is quite probable that current PC use at work, instead of 
generating productivity effects, captures these same characteristics. This is not to deny that 
workers who use a computer on the job may indeed be more productive. However, according 
to the findings of this study, higher productivity is not attributable to the use of computers, but 
rather to individual worker characteristics. Therefore, computer wage differentials are not due 
to productivity-enhancing computer technology, but arise rather because more able 
individuals are more likely to use a computer at work, and these individuals would earn a 
wage premium even in the absence of computer technology. 
 
5. Conclusion  
Having used data from the German Socio-Economic Panel Study (GSOEP) to analyze wages, 
we confirm that international evidence for wage differentials also applies to Germany. As 
other studies have found, computer wage differentials were substantial in the cross-section 
study for 1999, after including many worker and firm characteristics. However, cross-section 
results can be spurious, and greatly influenced by worker heterogeneity, and since the GSOEP 
does not provide information on measured ability, several types of panel study have been 
carried out to reduce the influence of unobserved worker characteristics and to increase the 
reliability of the results. The first approach was the conventional method of making use of 
panel data for the years from 1985 to 1999 provided by the GSOEP. It was found that 
computer wage premiums were reduced in the pooled OLS and in the random effects 
specifications, but did not vanish completely. However, in the fixed effects model, all the 
variables indicating PC use at work were statistically insignificant. Another approach 
                                                        
8
 If a person’s future PC use does capture his or her ability, one could get real returns to education by including 
this variable in the Mincer equation, in which case, the effect of ability and other unobservable individual 
characteristics on the schooling coefficient would be diminished. The inclusion of future PC use in the wage 
equation would reduce bias by controlling for the self-selection effect, which enables one to measure the purged 
education effect. 
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involved the inclusion of dummy variables indicating future PC use in the longitudinal 
regression. Since future PC-use variables had a statistical influence on the determination of 
wages, it can be concluded that current PC-use variables also capture those unobserved 
worker characteristics that affect earnings. The indications from the applied models are that it 
is not computer-induced productivity, but unobserved yet compensated worker characteristics, 
that matter. Although we acknowledge the increasing importance of computer skills in the job 
market, our labor-market policy implication is not to neglect general human capital 
accumulation. Since it is not sufficient to focus on computer training of workers, more weight 
should be put on general investments to promote workers’ education and their soft skills. 
 13
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Appendix 
 
Table A1: Description and Descriptive Statistics of Variables Used in the Regression Models 
Variable  Description Mean (SD) 
 Dependent variable Men Women 
lnminc Log monthly compensation rate, Deutsche Mark 8.43 (0.38) 8.14 (0.36) 
    
 Socio-demographic variables   
Age Age in years 39.88 (10.74) 36.04 (11.12) 
Married Marital status: 1 = married couple, else = 0 0.71 0.45 
Region0 Regional Dummy: 1=Berlin, else=0;  
Reference category 
0.03 0.05 
Region1 Regional Dummy: 1=Schleswig-Holstein, else = 0 0.04 0.03 
Region2 Regional Dummy: 1=Hamburg, else = 0 0.02 0.02 
Region3 Regional Dummy: 1= Lower Saxony, else = 0 0.11 0.11 
Region4 Regional Dummy: 1=Bremen, else = 0 0.01 0.01 
Region5 Regional Dummy: 1= North Rhine-Westphalia, else = 0 0.28 0.28 
Region6 Regional Dummy: 1=Hesse, else = 0 0.09 0.08 
Region7 Regional Dummy: 1= Rhineland-Palatinate/Saarland, else = 0 0.08 0.08 
Region8 Regional Dummy: 1=Baden-Württemberg, else = 0 0.16 0.16 
Region9 Regional Dummy: 1=Bavaria, else = 0 0.18 0.19 
    
 Education and work experience   
Edu Length of education in years 11.62 (2.27) 11.35 (2.02) 
Senior  Work experience at the same employer in years (seniority) 12.24 (10.07) 8.57 (7.77) 
Expfull  Previous work experience as full-time employee in years 18.50 (11.49) 12.66 (9.61) 
Exppart Previous work experience as part-time employee in years 0.26 (1.33) 1.39 (3.43) 
    
 Job characteristics   
Hours Actual working hours 43.01 (6.20) 40.90 (4.03) 
Public Work in the public sector: 1=yes, else=0 0.17 0.31 
Change Change of job: 1=yes, else=0 0.11 0.15 
Job0 No training necessary for the job: 1=yes, else=0;  
Reference category 
0.02 0.04 
Job1 Briefing or courses necessary for the job: 1=yes, else=0 0.27 0.29 
Job2 Vocational training necessary for the job: 1=yes, else=0 0.57 0.62 
Job3 College/University necessary for the job: 1=yes, else=0 0.13 0.05 
Jobcat0 Job category: 1=Manufacturing, else=0; Reference category 0.50 0.14 
Jobcat1 Job category: 1=Science, else=0 0.19 0.18 
Jobcat2 Job category: 1=Management, else=0 0.04 0.02 
Jobcat3 Job category: 1=Office/Administration, else=0 0.16 0.46 
Jobcat4 Job category: 1=Commerce, else=0 0.05 0.10 
Jobcat5 Job category: 1=Services, else=0 0.04 0.08 
Jobcat6 Job category: 1=Plants/Animals, else=0 0.01 0.01 
Bluecol Blue collar worker=1, else=0 0.49 0.20 
Bluecol0 Blue collar worker: 1=unskilled, else=0; Reference category 0.01 0.03 
Bluecol1 Blue collar worker: 1=skilled, else=0 0.13 0.11 
Bluecol2 Blue collar worker: 1=semiskilled, else=0 0.28 0.05 
Bluecol3 Blue collar worker: 1=foreman, else=0 0.05 0.01 
Bluecol4 Blue collar worker: 1=master, else=0 0.02 0.00 
Whiteco0 White collar worker: 1=foreman, else=0; Reference category 0.03 0.00 
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Whiteco1 White collar worker: 1=without vocational training, else=0 0.02 0.10 
Whiteco2 White collar worker: 1=with vocational training, else=0 0.11 0.26 
Whiteco3 White collar worker: 1=qualified occupation, else=0  0.20 0.37 
Whiteco4 White collar worker: 1=highly qualified occupation, else=0 0.14 0.07 
Whiteco5 White collar worker: 1=executive function, else=0 0.01 0.01 
    
 Industry (Reference category: all other branches)    
Branch1 Branch: 1=Energy/Water, else=0 0.03 0.01 
Branch2 Branch: 1=Chemicals, else=0 0.06 0.04 
Branch3 Branch: 1=Plastics, else=0 0.01 0.01 
Branch4 Branch: 1=Stone, else=0 0.01 0.01 
Branch5 Branch: 1=Metal, else=0 0.10 0.05 
Branch6 Branch: 1=Wood, else=0 0.04 0.02 
Branch7 Branch: 1=Textiles, else=0 0.01 0.04 
Branch8 Branch: 1=Food, else=0 0.03 0.02 
Branch9 Branch: 1=Construction, else=0 0.11 0.02 
Branch10 Branch: 1=Wholesale/Retail, else=0 0.08 0.14 
Branch11 Branch: 1=Transport, else=0 0.05 0.02 
Branch12 Branch: 1=Banking/Insurance, else=0 0.05 0.09 
Branch13 Branch: 1=Other services, else=0 0.08 0.25 
Branch14 Branch: 1=Non-Profit, else=0 0.02 0.05 
    
 Firm size    
Size1 Firm size < 5 employees 0.08 0.10 
Size2 Firm size > 5 and <20  employees 0.08 0.09 
Size3 Firm size > 20 and < 200 employees 0.26 0.28 
Size4 Firm size > 200 and < 2000 employees 0.27 0.28 
Size0 Firm size > 2000 employees; Reference category 0.31 0.25 
    
 PC variables   
NoPC Did not use a computer at all: 1=yes, else=0;  
Reference category 
0.60 0.57 
PChome Used a computer at home only: 1=yes, else=0 0.06 0.02 
PCwork Used a computer at work only: 1=yes, else=0 0.17 0.30 
PCboth Used a computer at home and at work: 1=yes, else=0 0.17 0.11 
    
 Future PC variables   
PC00 Did not use a computer at work neither today nor in the 
future; Reference category  
0.68 0.63 
PC01 Did not use a computer today (1985-1987), but in the future 
(after 1987) 
0.30 0.35 
PC11 Used a computer today and in future 0.02 0.02 
PC0 Did not use a computer today, but in the immediate future 
(before 1988) 
0.01 0.01 
PC1 Did not use a computer today, but in the near future (between 
1988 and 1990) 
0.10 0.14 
PC2 Did not use a computer today, but in the medium future 
(between 1991 and 1994) 
0.11 0.13 
PC3 Did not use a computer today, but in the distant future (after 
1994) 
0.08 0.07 
Source: GSOEP, 1985–1999. 
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Table A2: Model (II): Longitudinal Regressions With PCwork for men  
 
Pooled OLS Random Effects Fixed Effects Variable 
Parameter Parameter Parameter 
Intercept 7.3160** (0.0303) 7.1026** (0.9507) 6.6204** (0.0914) 
       
Year86 0.0378** (0.0104) 0.0342** (0.0067) -0.0000 (0.0064) 
Year87 0.0756** (0.0102) 0.0724** (0.0066) 0.0075 (0.0061) 
Year88 0.1170** (0.0102) 0.1059** (0.0067) 0.0069 (0.0059) 
Year89 0.1566** (0.0010) 0.1466** (0.0066) 0.0160** (0.0057) 
Year90 0.2047** (0.0101) 0.1960** (0.0067) 0.0354** (0.0057) 
Year91 0.1868** (0.0102) 0.2059** (0.0070) 0.0217** (0.0057) 
Year92 0.2467** (0.0102) 0.2653** (0.0071) 0.0507** (0.0057) 
Year93 0.2843** (0.0101) 0.3049** (0.0072) 0.0586** (0.0056) 
Year94 0.3054** (0.0102) 0.3285** (0.0073) 0.0526** (0.0057) 
Year95 0.3281** (0.0101) 0.3489** (0.0075) 0.0410** (0.0058) 
Year96 0.3635** (0.0102) 0.3941** (0.0077) 0.0573** (0.0060) 
Year97 0.3727** (0.0102) 0.3978** (0.0078) 0.0285** (0.0061) 
Year98 0.3692** (0.0104) 0.4034** (0.0081) 0.0068 (0.0064) 
Year99 0.3782** (0.0105) 0.4161** (0.0084) - - 
Age 0.0054** (0.0006) 0.0075** (0.0012) 0.0291** (0.0032) 
Married 0.0530** (0.0045) 0.0514** (0.0048) 0.0474** (0.0051) 
   
  
  
Region1 -0.0325* (0.0136) 
-0.0349 (0.0278) -0.0863 (0.0495) 
Region2 0.0139 (0.0166) 0.0056 (0.0309) -0.0853 (0.0501) 
Region3 -0.0340** (0.0113) 
-0.0622** (0.0240) -0.1590** (0.0443) 
Region4 -0.0486* (0.0192) 
-0.0618 (0.0358) -0.1135* (0.0576) 
Region5 -0.0083 (0.0106) 
-0.0355 (0.0227) -0.1563** (0.0430) 
Region6 -0.0027 (0.0116) 
-0.0103 (0.0249) -0.0981* (0.0486) 
Region7 -0.0291* (0.0118) 
-0.0735** (0.0255) -0.2042** (0.0510) 
Region8 0.0144 (0.0110) 0.0197 (0.0237) 0.0370 (0.0476) 
Region9 -0.0121 (0.0109) 
-0.0082 (0.0231) -0.0505 (0.0427) 
   
  
  
Edu 0.0219** (0.0013) 0.0366** (0.0022) 0.0144** (0.0045) 
   
  
  
Senior  0.0035** (0.0007) 0.0023** (0.0006) 0.0014* (0.0007) 
Senior2 -0.0000 (0.0000) 0.0000 (0.0000) 0.0000 (0.0000) 
Expfull  0.0149** (0.0009) 0.0165** (0.0014) 0.0281** (0.0036) 
Expfull2 -0.0004** (0.0000) 
-0.0004** (0.0000) -0.0004** (0.0000) 
Exppart -0.0256** (0.0026) 
-0.0295** (0.0050) -0.0099 (0.0104) 
Exppart2 0.0009** (0.0001) 0.0010** (0.0003) 0.0000 (0.0018) 
   
  
  
Hours 0.0098** (0.0003) 0.0066** (0.0003) 0.0062** (0.0003) 
Public -0.0560** (0.0055) 
-0.0401** (0.0066) -0.0317** (0.0073) 
Change -0.0565** (0.0062) 
-0.0494** (0.0043) -0.0456** (0.0043) 
Job1 0.0119 (0.0119) 0.0017 (0.0089) -0.0033 (0.0089) 
Job2 0.0332** (0.0122) 0.0078 (0.0094) -0.0067 (0.0095) 
Job3 0.1695** (0.0143) 0.0821** (0.0120) 0.0406** (0.0124) 
Jobcat1 -0.0086 (0.0077) 0.0141 (0.0078) -0.0065 (0.0084) 
Jobcat2 0.1195** (0.0108) 0.0610** (0.0097) 0.0267** (0.0100) 
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Jobcat3 -0.0253** (0.0073) 0.0024 (0.0075) -0.0080 (0.0081) 
Jobcat4 -0.0189 (0.0102) 0.0133 (0.0102) 0.0078 (0.0109) 
Jobcat5 -0.1133** (0.0103) 
-0.0828** (0.0126) -0.0496** (0.0143) 
Jobcat6 -0.0610** (0.0189) 
-0.0301 (0.0274) 0.0020 (0.0333) 
Bluecol -0.3019** (0.0206) 
-0.1660** (0.0169) -0.1073** (0.0173) 
Bluecol1 0.0457* (0.0180) 0.0345** (0.0133) 0.0234 (0.0134) 
Bluecol2 0.0904** (0.0180) 0.0570** (0.0140) 0.0346* (0.0142) 
Bluecol3 0.1567** (0.0193) 0.1021** (0.0153) 0.0746** (0.0155) 
Bluecol4 0.2719** (0.0215) 0.1292** (0.0174) 0.0812** (0.0177) 
Whiteco1 -0.2233** (0.0163) 
-0.1019** (0.0134) -0.0742** (0.0135) 
Whiteco2 -0.1196** (0.0122) 
-0.0629** (0.0103) -0.0560** (0.0104) 
Whiteco3 -0.0191 (0.0117) 
-0.0115 (0.0100) -0.0144 (0.0101) 
Whiteco4 0.0743** (0.0127) 0.0443** (0.0108) 0.0313** (0.0109) 
Whiteco5 0.1768** (0.0198) 0.0848** (0.0159) 0.0540** (0.0159) 
   
  
  
Branch1 0.0344** (0.0112) 0.0220 (0.0133) 0.0135 (0.0142) 
Branch2 0.0502** (0.0079) 0.0257** (0.0099) 0.0069 (0.0109) 
Branch3 -0.0192 (0.0152) 0.0053 (0.0149) -0.0013 (0.0155) 
Branch4 -0.0423** (0.0149) 
-0.0511** (0.0158) -0.0616** (0.0165) 
Branch5 -0.0199** (0.0065) 0.0037 (0.0061) 0.0099 (0.0063) 
Branch6 0.0157 (0.0097) 0.0008 (0.0119) -0.0033 (0.0130) 
Branch7 -0.1673** (0.0159) 
-0.0132 (0.0178) 0.0279 (0.0187) 
Branch8 -0.0638** (0.0106) 
-0.0121 (0.0123) 0.0136 (0.0132) 
Branch9 0.0114 (0.0066) 0.0125 (0.0073) 0.0172* (0.0078) 
Branch10 -0.1316** (0.0079) 
-0.0493** (0.0074) -0.0284** (0.0077) 
Branch11 -0.0264** (0.0085) 
-0.0064 (0.0100) 0.0047 (0.0109) 
Branch12 0.0221* (0.0093) 0.0196 (0.0137) -0.0066 (0.0162) 
Branch13 -0.0480** (0.0076) 
-0.0302** (0.0082) -0.0209* (0.0088) 
Branch14 -0.0768** (0.0145) 
-0.0409** (0.0151) -0.0457** (0.0159) 
   
  
  
Size1 -0.2174** (0.0075) 
-0.1212** (0.0075) -0.0788** (0.0081) 
Size2 -0.1682** (0.0075) 
-0.0995** (0.0074) -0.0689** (0.0078) 
Size3 -0.1086** (0.0049) 
-0.0517** (0.0053) -0.0283** (0.0057) 
Size4 -0.0558** (0.0047) 
-0.0240** (0.0047) -0.0122* (0.0048) 
   
  
  
PCwork 0.0253** (0.0048) 0.0118* (0.0048) -0.0008 (0.0050) 
       
Observations 15,536 15,536 15,536 
R2 0.6814 0.6524 0.1524 
Source: GSOEP, 1985–1999. 
Notes: * Statistically significant at the 5% level, ** at the 1% level. Standard errors in parentheses. 
